Patents in suit:
In Aortic Innovations v. Edwards Lifesciences, the Federal Circuit affirmed construing “outer frame: as a “self-expanding frame” based on clear implied lexicography via consistent interchangeable use in the specification. Because the accused device's frame expanded only with the assistance of a balloon, it did not read on the claimed “outer frame.”
In FMC v. Sharda USA, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's claim construction that relied on a narrowed interpretation based on a discussion in the provisional application but not in the asserted patent. The court held that when the patentee materially deletes limiting terminology (here, stability-related disclosures) between a provisional application and the issued patent’s specification, those deleted disclosures cannot be used to re-impose the deleted limitation in claim construction; the claim term should receive its plain and ordinary meaning absent other intrinsic support. Although similar claim terms in related patents are often construed consistently, that presumption yields where the patentee materially altered the specification in certain family members in a way that would direct a skilled artisan to understand a different intended meaning.
The court also rejected an attempt by FMC to narrow the claim scope based on a use in the pramble. Preamble language that merely states a purpose or intended use generally is not limiting. Moreover, differences in preamble wording across claims do not make the preamble limiting absent a basis to treat the preamble as claim scope-defining.
Stated the court:
In HD Silicon Solutions v. Microchip Tech., the Federal Court construed “comprising tungsten” to require elemental tungsten and held the Board's broader construction was incorrect, emphasizing intrinsic evidence over extrinsic evidence. Where the intrinsic record uses explicit compound nomenclature when compounds are intended (e.g., “titanium nitride”) and otherwise discusses a material only as the element with element-specific properties, “comprising [element]” is properly construed to require the elemental form (allowing incidental impurities) rather than encompassing compounds of that element. Extrinsic evidence (including other patents/publications) may assist understanding but cannot be used to vary or expand a claim meaning that is indicated by the patent’s claims/specification/prosecution history.
In Iqris Techs. v. Point Blank Enterprises, the Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly imported limitations into the term “pull cord,” rejecting a construction requiring direct pulling by a user and excluding cords with handles. The court held that, absent claim language or clear intrinsic evidence of lexicography/disavowal, a court may not limit “pull cord” to cords directly pulled by a user merely because the specification’s preferred embodiments depict direct pulling or use different labels for other cords.
In Lynk Labs v. Samsung Electronics Co. the Federal Circuit construed the claim term “matches” to mean “equal to or less than,” rather than strict equivalence, because the intrinsic evidence consistently describes “matching” in functional, tolerance-based terms rather than exact numerical identity. Reading the claim language in light of the specification as a whole, the court explained that the invention is concerned with avoiding over-driving LEDs, which is satisfied when the rectified input voltage does not exceed the aggregate forward voltage of the LEDs. Nothing in the intrinsic record limits “matches” to exact equality, and multiple passages expressly contemplate a “less than or equal to” relationship, making a broader construction not only reasonable but required.